Standard human capital theory suggests that individuals select into education in order to maximize their utility. If agents are risk averse, they select the educational level that minimizes future uncertainty. The possibility of self-selection complicates the identication of the causal contribution of education to uncertainty in future payos. In this paper the assumption of endogenous school choices due to concerns about future risk is tested and the importance of uncertainty in shaping schooling choices is assessed. Relying on a exible semiparametric procedure allowing for self selection, bounds for the eect of eld of study in college on uncertainty are estimated and, in a second stage, exploited for modeling schooling choices. The results of the empirical investigation do conrm that individuals self-select into education in order to minimize uncertainty and maximize returns. Only selection of Humanities type of majors is unaected by risk or expected returns.
Introduction
The enormous empirical literature on human capital and earnings stemming from the seminal works of Mincer (1958; 1962) and Becker (1975) often assumes utility maximizing agents selecting their educational level as a consequence of their expected present value of education. This successful approach postulates agents possessing an adequate knowledge on future payos of dierent types of educations and on their ability to successfully complete the educational path chosen. Obviously, investment decisions on education are taken under a considerable amount of uncertainty. Uncertainty regarding ones performance in school, uncertainty about the future labor market conditions and uncertainty about future macroeconomic environment, just to name a few. Incorporating these elements into the usual framework of schooling and career choices would be a natural relaxation of standard assumptions and would greatly improve the understanding of the mechanics of educational choice formation.
Surprisingly enough, empirical evidence on schooling choices under uncertainty is scarce at best (Altonji, 1993; Cunha et al., 2005; Zafar, 2011) . Even scarcer is the body of literature assessing the role that concerns about non predictable future returns play in the selection of education. This seems at odds with recent literature on risk in education (Cunha et al., 2005; Lemieux, 2006; Chen and Khan, 2007; Chen, 2008; Mazza and van Ophem, 2010) treating self-selection into education, motivated by risk concerns on the part of choice makers, as given. In this framework, self-selection might arise as a consequence of risk aversion. The possibility of self-selecting into education complicates the identication of the specic parameters of interest. Proper risk, in fact, should be dened as that part of labor market performance which can not be anticipated by the individual, but each individual possesses some private information inaccessible to the researcher. If the private information is acted upon and, consequently, education is selected in order to minimize uncertainty, simple metrics such as the variance of error terms of a wage equation would confuse risk and private information.
In this article, I test the existence of self-selection into type of education triggered by distaste for risk and the role that uncertainty plays in shaping educational decisions. Before identifying the eects of risk on individuals preferences for eld of study two hurdles must be cleared. First, potential self-selection needs to be accounted for. Second, wage variance corrected for self-selection has to be separated between risk and private information. Building up on recent developments of the literature on semiparametric estimators, this paper proposes a model for educational choices correcting for self-selection when uncertainty of future payos is accounted for and able to disentangle the separate contribution of uncertainty and unobserved heterogeneity.
The empirical strategy adopted falls into the growing literature on semiparametric estimation.
As the common parametric techniques have come under closer scrutiny and received growing criticism (see, for example, Goldberger, 1983) , a series of new semiparametric estimators for dichotomous choice models have been developed in the literature (Lee, 1983; Robinson, 1988; Cosslett, 1991; Ahn and Powell, 1993; Newey, 2009 ). On the other hand, polychotomous choice models have received considerably less attention. Dahl (2002) proposes a two-step semiparametric method correcting for sample selection bias in the case of multiple possible outcomes. I combine this semiparametric estimation method for unordered outcomes with a parametric method in the rst stage. Ideally, I 2 would like to avoid any distributional assumption for both error terms in the choice and outcome equation. In my case, as I need to decompose the variance of the wage equation in its dierent elements, some structure for the error terms is necessary. The estimation strategy adopted in the present work assumes normality only for the distribution of the disturbance term for the choice equation without imposing joint normality of the error terms. Furthermore, I extend the original model by introducing uncertainty of future payos in the choice formation routine.
Next to the obvious advantages of producing consistent parameter estimates in a fairly general set of data generating processes, the particular method adopted here presents some additional attractive features that could be easily extended to other polychotomous settings. In particular, consistency of the second stage estimation does not require an exclusion restriction as most other parametric or semiparametric estimators (Robinson, 1988; Cosslett, 1991; Newey, 2009) do. Since valid exclusion restrictions are, in practice, hard to come across (Bound et al., 1995) and exogeneity is often hard to justify and test, not having to depend on a valid instrumental variable can only increase the estimates reliability. Endogenous instruments, in fact, can lead to an amplication in parameters' estimates bias compared to simple OLS (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) .
To my knowledge, this is the rst paper adopting a semiparametric strategy, able to assess the separate impact of risk and unobserved heterogeneity on unordered choices for type of education.
The only other paper semiparametrically correcting for self selection and separately identifying risk and unobserved heterogeneity is Mazza and van Ophem (2010) , while Chen (2008) accomplishes the same result, but strictly parametrically. Both works are only interested in gauging the causal eect of education on risk and not the eect of uncertainty on schooling choices. Additionally, this is the rst paper that disentangles the various components of wage variance via a semiparametric estimator in a context for which a clear order of choices is not a-priori determined.
Theoretical advancement is not the only motivation behind the present research. Understanding the extent of the inuence that uncertainty exerts on individuals choices is of direct interest for policy makers and sound empirical evidence on this matter is severely lacking. Consider, for example, an economy in which some particular occupation can not meet enough supply in the labor market due to excessive risk in the required education for accessing it. A government willing to propel a more ecient labor supply structure might consider the public provision of insurance coverage for those individual ready to undertake that particular educational path. Furthermore, if riskier human capital investments are leading to higher returns to education, and if poorer individuals avoid them due to the absence of the intrinsic nancial buer that family income oers, intergenerational and social mobility might be severely reduced.
The analysis, which exploits data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), proceeds in four steps. First, probabilities for major led selection are estimated with a multinomial probit model. In the second step these probabilities serve as basis for the construction of the correction function to get consistent estimates for the wage equation. The correction functions enter the wage equation signicantly, suggesting that self-selection exists. The results for the wage equation show that self-selection into education leads to a signicant downward bias of OLS estimation for returns to education up to more than 100%. Third, the various elements of wage variance are either point estimated or bounded within some admissible range of values. Results 3 conrm the well known increase in transitory earnings volatility for the US in the past twenty years and show how graduates in Science and Social Sciences disciplines are better immunized against macroeconomic shocks compared to graduates in Humanities and Health and Education. At the same time, those same type of educations protect against total uncertainty dened as the sum of transitory volatility and individual specic permanent volatility. In the nal step, the responsiveness of educational choices to dierences in risk associated with the distinct major type is tested. I nd that the theoretical prediction of a negative impact of risk and a positive impact of expected returns on educational selection is conrmed for three out of four educational groups, the only exception being the Humanities group.
2 Theoretical model I present here a four steps model for the estimation of the impact of future wage uncertainty on educational choices. The model builds on Dahl (2002) who proposes a semiparametric estimation method for polychotomous choice models. The original model concerns internal migration choices in the US where self-selection raises from dierentials in returns for education in the 51 US states.
In my framework choices are limited to four educational categories and self-selection occurs as a consequence of individual specic tastes for education. Additionally, the focus of my research is not centered on means returns to education, but on the dispersion of returns, thus, uncertainty is added to the original model.
The rst steps of a four stages procedure consist in estimating the probability of selection into one of the four educational groups 1 -Humanities, Science, Social Science and Health and Education, these probabilities serve as basis for constructing four selection adjustments terms that in the second stage are included in a wage equation reestablishing the condition of zero mean on the error term allowing estimation by ordinary least squares. In the third step the real magnitude of risk is assessed and disentangled from private information. Finally, the assumption of individuals self-selecting into education as a consequence of comparative advantages is tested and the impact of uncertainty concerns on type of education selection is estimated.
2.1 A model for school choice and wages in the presence of uncertainty In this section, I present a Roy (1951) model for multiple educational choice that builds on Dahl (2002) in its general structure, adapting the analysis to educational choices and introducing uncertainty on future payos. Consider N individuals facing four possible choices for major type in college m: Humanities (m i = 1); Sciences (m i = 2); Social Sciences (m i = 3); and Health and Education (m i = 4). In this stylized world there are two periods. In the rst period, after high school and conditional to wanting to acquire a college education, the individual selects the type of major that he wants to pursue according to his inclinations and the expected income that that specic type of education allows him to earn. In the second period, once a college degree has been attained, he enters the labor market and a stream of income is earned for T periods. Observing all relevant variables for schooling choice, each individual (i) compares the benets obtainable in each of the m categories and opts for the utility maximizing one, with utility being a function of expected earnings, earnings uncertainty and tastes aecting choices. Tastes aecting educational choice are potentially innite. Among others they include tastes and inclination for a specic type of education, private information including individuals' own assessment on the riskiness of major m and individual specic risk attitude. A common feature of these factors is that they are all unobservable to the econometrician. How these personal characteristics translate in the labor market is not completely revealed to the choice maker even though private information allows him to form a more precise estimate for both the protability and the uncertainty of incomes associated with each of the m categories compared to the econometrician who is unable to use the same information. Formally, my model comprises two inter-related equations: an additively separable utility function (1) and a potential wage equation (2) for each major m = 1, 2, 3, 4:
In equation (1) 
) and private information (ν i ). ϑ 1 and ϑ 2 are the coecients associated with expected wages and uncertainty.
Parameter ϑ 2 is the key parameter in this paper, its estimates are reported in table 8. Expectations are formed conditioning on individual observed (x it0 ) and unobserved (ν i ) characteristics evaluated at time t 0 . Equation (2) species individual log earnings (y mit ) in each of the four major types m as a function of a major type specic constant (α m ), a vector of individual characteristics (x it ), an individual xed eect component (σ mi e mi ) and an idiosyncratic transitory shock capturing macroeconomics or institutional changes and aecting individuals earnings (ψ mt it ). e mi and it are random unit root variables uncorrelated with each other. Note also that the loading factor σ in front of the individual xed eect component is allowed to vary with type of education. In this way, considerations of comparative advantages enter individuals' decision mechanism. If the loading factor is equal across major types, the individual xed eect is rewarded equally at all levels. For the scope of this paper the identication of the variance of potential wages (σ 2 mi + ψ 2 mt ) plays a key role since this variance serves as basis for the construction of the risk coecient whose eect on choices I want to estimate. It is important to note that while the shock term does not correlate either with observed or unobserved characteristics, the individual xed eect does with both.
Selection of the preferred type of education is determined by considerations of comparative advantages depicted in equation (1). Formally, individuals choose the educational levels for which:
2 The exact specication of τ 2 mit 0
is provided in equation (6).
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where I mi is an indicator function assuming value 1 if that specic major is selected and 0 otherwise.
] since expectations are assumed to be age independent and therefore time subscript t 0 is omitted in the remainder of the paper for ease of notation.
The system of equations in (1) and (2) can not be directly estimated for three reasons: rst, all the relevant variables for major choice are unobserved; second, private information aects both the choice of major type and the realization of wages introducing a selection bias in the estimation of the wage equation; third, in the data individuals are observed in only one of the four possible states thus the estimation of the determinants of major choice requires generating counterfactual earnings and uncertainty, accounting for self-selection, for the other three options. Self-selection is treated in section 3.1, counterfactual imputation is treated in section 6 while for the identication of the unknown parameters σ 2 mi , τ 2 mi and ν i some additional assumption regarding the functional form are necessary.
More specically, I need to specify how unobserved heterogeneity (ν i ) relates to the individual specic permanent component (σ mi e mi ). I indicate the correlation term between the two with (ρ m ) and in equation (4), following Mazza and van Ophem (2010) , I dene a linear relation for the conditional expectations of the two:
where I assume that: Willis and Rosen (1979) , the correlation coecient is not restricted to assume positive values allowing either positive or negative selection into type of education. In the presence of positive selection (i.e.: ρ m > 0) a high predisposition for a specic type of education translates into higher wages in the labor market, the opposite occurs in case of negative selection (i.e.: ρ m < 0). The linear assumption is needed for the separate identication of wage uncertainty and unobserved heterogeneity.
Using these distributional assumptions, an equation for expected wages and expected uncertainty from the individual standpoint can be derived:
This formulation illustrates the contribution of the parameter ν i to wage expectations and, through the correlation coecient ρ s , to personal uncertainty. Regarding the rst relationship, we can easily see from equation (5) that in the presence of positive selection individuals with a high degree of predisposition for a specic type of education are rewarded in the labor market while the opposite occurs in the case of negative selection. On the other hand, expression (6) illustrates the channel through which the unobserved schooling factor relates to the uncertainty components.
In fact, if the correlation between unobserved schooling factor (ν i ) and the xed individual eect σ mi e mi is perfect (i.e.: ρ m = 1) individuals can predict perfectly how their own inclinations translate in the labor market and uncertainty is only caused by variance in transitory shocks (ψ other hand, when correlation is absent (i.e.: ρ m = 0) the individual does not posses any additional information compared to the econometrician on how his unobserved abilities aect his wages in the future and uncertainty equates observed wage variance.
Using the relation expressed in (5) I dene an equation for the deviation of individuals' expected wages from population average earnings, obtaining:
Equation (7) simply states that the deviation of individual expected earnings from the average students in category m given his observable characteristics and unobservable tastes for schooling is the individual specic error term γ m ν i in equation (5). The transitory shock component in equation (2) is dierenced out since it is supposed to be uncorrelated with individual characteristics and thus it aects all individuals with m i = m equally. The equality makes clear that deviations from the population mean are a function of the specic schooling tastes expressed by ν i and how these tastes correlate with individual specic component.
I dene a similar equation for the deviation of individuals taste for education from the population average:
w mit is an error term for individual deviations from mean tastes. Tastes for type of education m include a number of possible variables such as the inclination for a specic subject, anticipated likelihood of obtaining a degree for major m, or the anticipated individual wage risk associated with that type of education.
I can now rewrite expression (1) in terms of population means and individual specic error component:
where
is referred to as the subutility function. I assume the error term s mit to be multivariate normally distributed with mean zero and covariance matrix:
The selection rule expressed in equation (3) can now be rewritten as:
Thus, earnings are observed only for the utility maximizing choice and if the selection equations outlined in (11) are satised simultaneously. Equations (1) 3 Semiparametric estimation of a Roy model with multiple sectors
The most common procedure for estimation of models with self-selection and binary outcomes is the Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1974; 1976; 1979) . The model presented here allows for four possible choices. In case of multiple options, the approach depends on the structure of the outcomes that can either be ordered according to some natural and evident structure, or unordered, in case this ordering is not apparent. In the rst case, the selection correction term is usually derived from an ordered probit regression in the rst stage which, after some transformation, is then included in the outcome equation (Vella, 1998) obtaining consistent estimates of the β's. In the second case, when no ordering of choices is possible, the rst stage can be estimated via a conditional logit model or its extension the nested logit model (McFadden, 1984; Trost and Lee, 1984; Falaris, 1987) .
All these methods rely on heavy assumptions on the distribution of the error terms in the choice and selection equations. If the true joint distribution is not correctly specied and it is dierent from the designated one, the estimated parameters in the outcome equation are severely biased (Goldberger, 1983) with the level of bias increasing as the self-selected sample size increases (Dahl, 2002) . These criticisms generated a fertile line of research proposing alternative methods imposing limited distributional assumptions (Cosslett, 1983; Gallant and Nychka, 1987; Robinson, 1988; Ahn and Powell, 1993; Powell, 1994; Newey, 2009 ).
All these methods address binary choice models and, similarly to their parametric counterparts, imply estimation in two steps 3 . In the rst step, some nonparametric or semiparametric estimator of the parameters in the choice equation, for which the distribution of the error term remain unspecied, is used. These estimates form the basis for the construction of a 'single-index' correction function g(.) which is then included in the second stage allowing consistent estimates of the parameters in the outcome equation.
If research on semiparametric estimation methods for binary response models has received some attention in recent literature, very little eort has been dedicated to the semiparametric estimation of polychotomous choice models. One of the few exceptions is Dahl (2002) who proposes a model for unordered choices regarding migration decisions.
I exploit Dahl's work and adapt it to the dierent needs that my research question poses.
The main methodological dierence between my and Dahl's framework resides in the structure of the error term in the choice equation. In fact, in order to be able to separate risk from private information, the error term in the rst stage is assumed to be normally distributed.
Additionally, Roy models based on utility maximization, such as the present one, present a specic challenge: the correct specication of the subutility function V m and the choice of variables to include in it. In my framework, a plethora of variables are potential candidates for inclusion 3 For a textbook discussion of parametric and semiparametric selection models see Cameron and Trivedi (2005) .
8 and many of these variables are either unobservable or non perfectly measurable. The model that I present here sidesteps the estimation of underlying parameters of the subutility function and thus, does not require the correct specications of tastes.
Schooling probabilities as sucient statistics in single and multipleindex models
The estimation method that I present here for schooling choices is building on previous works by Dahl (2002) , Lee (1983) and Ahn and Powell (1993) on semiparametric estimation methods.
As already noted by Heckman and Robb (1985) and Ahn and Powell (1993) in single-index selection models the selectivity bias can be expressed as the probability of selection given covariates.
This follows from the fact that in latent index models, the mean of the error term in the outcome equation for the selected sample is an invertible function of the selection probability (Dahl, 2002 ).
Ahn and Powell exploit this fact in order to avoid estimation of an unknown distribution function for the selection errors. Dahl extends this idea to multiple-index models providing a relatively simple semiparametric correction for polychotomous selection models. In this section I rst show the formulation of Ahn and Powell (1993) for single-index models and then the extension that Dahl provides to multiple-index.
Considering the theoretical model presented in section 2.1 I rewrite the earnings equation as:
In this formulation Let's now dene the joint density function of the error term in equation (2) and in equation (11) describing the selection criteria, as:
. Lee (1983) shows that
Dahl takes advantage of Lee's results and imposes the following index-suciency assumption:
where p mi is the probability that individual i selects major type m given the vector of subutilities
exhausts all the information about how the dierences in subutility functions inuence the joint distribution of the error term in the outcome equation and max r (V r − V m + s ri − s mi ) contained in the sample, which is equivalent from stating that the conditional distribution of u mit and max r (V r − V m + s ir − s mi ) can depend on the conditioning variables only through the single index p mi .
The single index p mi is the probability of each individual rst best education choice; in other words it is the major choice observed in the data and can be rewritten as:
The dierences in subutility functions determine the choice for type of education, thus they need to be accounted for when estimating p mi . Using equation (13) the earnings equation expressed in (12) can be rewritten as:
where for each supergroup m, λ m (.) is an unknown function of the single index p mi and E[ω mit |x it , p mi , I mi = 1] = 0 by construction 5 .
All the results reported until this point were already obtained by Lee (1983) . The specic contribution of Dahl (2002) is extending the single index correction function in equation (15) to multiple index framework.
Dahl's intuition is that, subject to the invertibility condition:
which simply implies that multiple education type choice probabilities contain the same information as the dierence in subutilities functions, the earnings equations can be rewritten as multiple-index, partially linear models that depend on all M schooling probabilities:
The assumption contained in equation (13) reduces this equivalence by imposing that only the probability of the utility maximizing choice matters. The assumption can be relaxed allowing for other probabilities beside the rst-best choice to inuence the distribution of g m . Indicating with q the subset, or full set, of schooling probabilities {p im , . . . , p M i }, a less restrictive assumption can be written as:
From this expression the earnings equation can be rewritten as a multiple-index, partially linear model, where the bias correction is an unknown function of the revealed rst-best choice plus a few other chosen probabilities.
In my application of this model to type of major choice the number of probabilities, other than the revealed choice, candidate for inclusion is necessarily limited. I can then estimate a very rich model with the inclusion of all major type selection probability and compare it with the most parsimonious model possible. This is the way I proceed and describe in Section 5.3. The choice of 5 See Dahl (2002) for analytical proof of this result.
10 these probabilities implies the following distributional assumption:
and the following earning equation:
I refer toλ m (.) as the selection correction function which is an unknown function of four probabilities
Empirical estimation
In the previous section I have outlined the general structure of a semiparametric model in a polychotomous choice framework in the presence of self-selection as presented by Dahl (2002) and my adaptation to the present application for college major choice. OLS estimates of equation (20) produce consistent estimates for the parameters of interests.
The focus of this paper is rst obtaining consistent estimates for the level of unanticipated wage dispersion that each schooling level entails and then, in a second step, assessing how heavily individuals weigh the risk factor when taking schooling decisions. Both steps need to account for individuals' private information and thus, intrinsic to risk estimation, is the identication of private information. In the following section I illustrate the empirical implementation choices and the necessary steps for identication of the transitory component of wage variance (ψ 
Estimation for the selection probabilities
The model presented hinges on the assumption that the researcher can consistently estimate the probabilities associated with each schooling choice for each individual. The most common procedures adopted in the literature for estimation of selection probabilities are the conditional logit model and the ordered probit model in case of unordered or ordered outcomes respectively. The main drawbacks of these two methods are their dependence on heavy distributional assumptions 6 .
Ideally, I would like to semiparametrically estimate both stages. The literature on semiparametric estimators in the presence of unordered choice structure is very scarce (Matzkin, 1993; Dahl, 2002; Bayer et al., 2011) and for none of these estimators the full asymptotic properties are derived. As evident from the expressions for σ mi , τ mit and δ mi estimates for the conditional and unconditional variance of the error term in the choice equation are needed if the variance of wages has to be decomposed between our parameters of interest. Therefore I estimate the rst stage and the probabilities of schooling selection via a multinomial probit model, assuming normality for the distribution of the disturbance term in the secondary equation, but avoiding to impose joint normality on the error terms for the selection and outcome equation.
Compared to the conditional logit model the multinomial probit has the considerable advantage of allowing for the error terms for the dierent options to be correlated eluding the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption imposed by multinomial or conditional logit models.
Identifying the two components of wage variance
Intra-educational wage variance can result from observed heterogeneity expressed by β m in equation (2) or unobserved heterogeneity which is captured by the error term in the same equation.
In this model the error term in equation (2) is composed by an individual specic xed term (σ mi e mi ) and an idiosyncratic shock (ψ mt it ); the variance of these two elements (σ 2 mi + ψ 2 mt ) captures the unobserved part of wage variance which, in turns, includes both risk and private information. This part of wage variance is my target of identication in the rst step.
Starting from the same premises Chen (2008) , in a parametric setting, and Mazza and van Ophem (2010) , semiparametrically, derive an expression for variance of wages. Adapting their results to the present framework with utility maximization I obtain:
δ mi is referred to as the truncation adjustment needed in order to retrieve the untruncated distribution of wage variance. Following Lee (1982; and Maddala (1983) and given the distributional assumptions in (10) its analytical expression is given by:
Φ(ziϕ) . The probabilities for schooling selection are estimated with a multinomial probit model given the distributional assumptions in (10) 7 . δ mi determines whether observed wage inequality overstates or understates potential wage inequality. If δ mi > 0 observed wage inequality overstates potential inequality and vice versa in case δ mi < 0.
In order to be able to disentangle the transitory shock component from the permanent component a panel data structure is essential. In fact, an individual xed-eect model dierences out the time invariant permanent component σ mi e mi so that the unexplained part of wage variance in the model can be attributed to external and unanticipated idiosyncratic shocks which is one part of wage risk properly dened.
In the present framework a xed-eect model for individual earnings takes the form:
y i , x i andκ mi denote the average of individual earnings, time varying covariates and error term, respectively, over the time period taken into consideration andκ mi ≡ ψ mt it . Consequently, the 7 For derivation see Maddala (1983) . 
With the inclusion of the correction term, the between-individual model can be consistently es- Mazza and van Ophem (2010) show that with only the assumption of linearity on the error terms discussed in section 2.1, it is possible to obtain an analytical expression for the permanent component corrected for truncation and self-selection:
As in Chen (2008) 
Separate identication for risk and unobserved heterogeneity
For the purpose of this paper it is essential to separately identify the risk coecient τ 
Estimating the correction function
In a semiparametric framework the correction function is left unspecied. Dierent methods exist for estimation of an unknown function. In this paper I employ a series expansions for estimation of the unknown function. The method was rst introduced by Newey (1997) . The approximation for individuals in major category m is: 14 5 The causal impact of risk on education My empirical estimation for the importance of concerns on risk on the choice of education proceeds in four steps. In the rst, the probability of major type selection is estimated following the procedure explained in section 4.1; these probabilities are then used for calculating the basis functions, and thus the selectivity correction terms, in equation (26) and dummies for geographical characteristics for the area of origin at age 17 11 . The AFQT is a series of four tests in mathematics, science, vocabulary and automotive knowledge. The test was administered in 1980 to all subjects regardless their age and schooling level. For this reason it can include age and schooling eects in the ability index that the test is meant to construct. To correct for these undesired eects, I follow Kane and Rouse (1995) and Neal and Johnson (1996) . First I regress the original test score on age dummies and quarter of birth, then we replace the original test score with the residuals obtained from this regression.
The choice variable deserves some further discussion. The multinomial probit estimation procedure becomes intractable with the standard statistical package used 12 , when the possible outcomes exceed four. Therefore, I grouped the dierent major as dened in the NLSY in four big categories: Humanities, Sciences, Social Sciences and Health and Education 13 . In this way I obtain four unordered categories that can be estimated via a multinomial probit procedure that allows for correlation of errors. It is evident that people graduating from Humanities belong to families with a more favorable economic and educational background. Both mother's and father's education, as well as family income, are at their highest for this category. Additionally, AFQT score is also higher for them, while the share of ethnic minorities is the lowest among the four categories. The opposite occurs in the case of Health and Education group which is at the bottom for parents education, family income and ability measure.
It is also worth noting how ethnic minorities are overrepresented and that the majority of individuals in my sample were brought up in an urban environment.
Step 1: Schooling choice rst stage estimates
The individuals probabilities to chose one of the four elds of study in college serve as basis for the construction of the correction functions b q m (.) in equation (26). The rst stage estimates for the multinomial probit model described in section 4.1 from which the choice probabilities are derived 12 Stata version 10.0. 13 See appendix for the exact denition of these categories. 14 See section 4.1. 15 A simple probit analysis for the probability of dropping out of my sample due to lack of information shows how females and ethnic minorities are less prone to attrition than white males while family income and AFQT score are very precisely estimated to have a 0 eect. All coecients for the other observable characteristics are not signicant. Estimation results available on request. The covariate high school curriculum records the number of hours per week that each respondent dedicates to subjects belonging to one of the four educational supercategories in the last year of high school 16 . The coecient shown is not group dependent (i.e.: it holds for each of the four categories).
As expected, there is a positive relation between this variable and college major selection. The only other factors consistently aecting the choice for eld of study are gender, being Afro-American and ability. Not surprisingly, girls are signicantly more likely to select Humanities than Sciences, but even more likely to choose Health and Education. African-American college students are particularly attracted by Social Science subjects and little by Health and Education. No discernible pattern is evident for Hispanic students. Last, students with high AFQT score appear to select Social Science category. Table 4 reports the estimated variance covariance matrix. The variance for Sciences is xed at 2. The interpretation of the estimated covariance matrix coecient is quite dicult and of limited practical interest since it only describes the dierences in errors relative to alternative Humanities Note: standard deviations in parentheses.
probability of selection for this category. Social science is the most likely choice for both AfricanAmerican and Caucasian respondent, while Hispanic prefer Health and Education disciplines.
Step 2: Corrected estimates for the returns on education
The estimation of eld of study choice probabilities illustrated in the previous section is propaedeutical to the identication of unbiased college major coecients in the earning equation. In this section I report estimates of the earnings equation according to the implementation choices outlined in section 4. The dependent variable of the earnings equation is here the log of hourly wages.
The independent variables are gender, work experience, ethnic origin (Caucasian is the omitted category), mother's and father's years of education, family of origin income, three dummies for eld of study category (I exclude the dummy for Health and Education), four dummies for geographic area of origin (with people grown up in the North East the excluded category) and a control for personal ability measured by the AFQT (adjusted) score. As most of these variables, particularly the four major categories, are time invariant I use the between-individual model in equation (23) for identication.
In the specication of the basis function b q m (.) the choice of the number of probability to be included is essential. The rst natural choice is that of including only the best (revealed) choice.
As mentioned in section 4.4 consistency of the methodology adopted in this paper requires the number of probabilities included in the basis function to be suciently large. Since no standard procedure exists for guiding the researcher in the correct choices of probabilities to include, in a second specication of the earning equation I augment the most parsimonious specication possible by the inclusion of the probabilities for all schooling types. A likelihood ratio test for the two models will provide me with some insight for the choice of the best specication. The test shows that the more extensive model outperforms the other, therefore I show, and base my estimates for wage variabilities on, only the favorite specication 17 . As for the choice of the order of polynomial expansions used for the creation of the correction functions, after the appropriate likelihood ratio test for model selection, I decide to use a third degree expansion 18 .
Since I substitute estimates of the real schooling probabilities in the earning equation, in the second stage naive standard errors would probably be downward biased (Dahl, 2002; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) . I correct for the extra sample variability by bootstrapping 19 .
Results of the wage equation estimation are presented in Table 6 20 . The two columns in Table   6 report estimations of the uncorrected model and the corrected model respectively.
When reading the results, particular attention should be paid to the major eld coecients. The dierence between the uncorrected and the corrected college major coecients is evident. Major coecients increase by a factor of ten in all three cases and change sign.
A test for presence of self-selection is given by the Wald test statistic testing the signicance of the correction term in my wage equation. The test statistic reported in Table 6 indicates that the correction function enters signicantly at the one percent condence level granting some condence on the ability of my correction function to detect selection bias.
The other coecients are very similar between the corrected and uncorrected specication: they all show the expected sign and, with the exception of parents schooling, are very precisely estimated.
The only exceptions are the two coecients for ethnic minorities that show a counterintuitive positive sign. This somehow surprisingly result was encountered also in previous estimates of wage equations by Cameron and Taber (2004) and Chen (2008) on the same sample of American young men.
5.4
Step 3: Point identication and bounds on wage variance parameters In this section I provide estimates and bounds for the four crucial parameters for assessing the impact of risk on college major choice: the transitory component of wage variance(ψ 2 mt ) and bounds for the permanent component (σ 2 mi ), the risk parameter (τ 2 mit ) and unobserved heterogeneity (ν i ). As explained in section 4.3 point identication for the permanent component σ 2 mi is not possible given the exible structure of the error term and of the correction functions adopted in this paper.
Since the risk parameter τ 2 mit is a function of the permanent component also this parameter can only be bounded within a given interval.
The only parameter which can be point estimated, given the methodology adopted in this work, is (ψ mt ). Details for its derivation are given in section 4.2. Figure 1 plots the time series of estimated transitory component of wage variance by eld of study (ψ 2 mt ). At lest two important pieces of evidence can be extrapolated from this gure, the rst regarding the coverage that dierent edu- 17 Results of the test are available on request. 18 For model choice I used a likelihood test ratio. The null hypothesis is strongly rejected at a 1% condence level. Results of the test are available on request.
19 Bootstrapping, with 400 repetitions, increases the standard errors by around 2% for most of the imputed regressors, but has no impact on standard errors for the other regressors. 20 My estimation results are based on a more parsimonious specication for the wage equation assuming βm = β for all m in equation (2). The identication method and results, are not aected by allowing β to vary with major type. Results available on request. */**/*** indicate condence levels of 10/5/1 percent respectively. Geographic controls include three dummies for residence at 14 (South is the excluded category). Demographic controls for year and quarter of birth.
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cational paths oer to macroeconomic and institutional shocks, the second concerning the evolution of wage volatility for American college graduates throughout the past twenty years.
From this plot we can easily see how graduates of scientic disciplines, in particular, and Social Sciences are those better protected from macroeconomic and institutional shocks. At the opposite, Humanities graduates are those more exposed to macroeconomic uctuations in almost every survey year staring from the early 1990s onwards. The last category of Health and Education behaves quite similarly to Humanities.
As for the time trend, the well known long-running rise of earning transitory volatility (Dynan et al., 2007) is conrmed here and it is irrespective of schooling level. In accordance with previous literature (Haider, 2001; Shin and Solon, 2011) , I nd a consistent increase in earning volatility starting with the last years of the past century and accentuating in the past decade.
It is worth noting that in my model on the job training is absent by construction. In fact, remember that the model envisages only two periods: the rst when individuals invest in education and the second when individuals enter the labor market and collect their wages. It is evident that if on the job training investments are undertaken after completion of the selected course of study, these investments are overlooked in my estimation and their eects would be confounded with macroeconomic shocks in the transitory component.
Estimates for all the parameters of interest are concisely reported in table 7. Row A describes the mean over time and by schooling level for the transitory component of wage inequality visually described in gure 1. Clearly, wage uncertainty due to idiosyncratic shocks is minimal for the Science group and at its maximum for the Humanities graduates.
Row B shows lower and upper bounds for the permanent component corrected for selection and truncation as described in equation (25) . Remember that the lower bound is set for ρ College major category
Upper/lower bound risk Upper/lower bound unobs. het.
Note: College major category classication: 1 = Humanities; 2 = Sciences; 3 = Social Sciences; 4 = Health and Education
The last parameter of interest is unobserved heterogeneity. Compared to all other estimated parameters, its magnitude is minimal. Also in this case, with the exception of Health and Education, the bounds are comfortably narrow and the most precisely estimated bounds are those for the Social Science category. The highest unobserved heterogeneity is found in the Health and Education category, probably reecting the heterogeneity of this specic category classication, but even in this case and considering the largest possible impact, its contribution to total wage variance is a mere 34%. The much higher contribution of risk compared to unobserved heterogeneity to wage variance was also encountered by other estimations concerned with level of education (Chen, 2008) . Equation (27) describes a multinomial probit model for the selection of major m instead of type r in terms of earnings, risk and individual specic taste for education:
The two main explanatory variable for the probability of selecting major type m are the wage and risk associated with that specic category estimated in the previous step.ŷ im is the estimated log individual earnings for major type m,τ im the log of the risk component, ν i the log of the estimated taste for schooling parameter and an error term. The subscripts m indicate the dierent college majors. I only observe earnings and associated risk in the case that m i = m, while earnings and risk for the counterfactual are not observed. What I can observe in the data is the outcome for individuals for whom observable characteristics x it closely match those of the individual of interest.
Matching the two type of individuals and imputing the revealed outcome for the "treated" as counterfactual for the "untreated" individual is a viable methodology given that I can control for a rich set of variables and given that selection is driven only by observables (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) . The assumption is strong and most likely not respected in my framework. Equation (1), in fact, describes the mechanism governing schooling selection and makes evident that individual select into education according to two criteria: expected income and the unobserved schooling parameter ν i . Nevertheless, in section 5.4 I provide estimates for the admissible range of values of the unobserved heterogeneity parameter. I can then include this parameter in the matching algorithm and match on both observable characteristics and unobservable schooling factor rendering the selection mechanism only dependent on observable characteristics. As for the implementation of the matching procedure, I apply the propensity score matching method originally proposed in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) with "caliper matching" 21 .
Remember that I do not posses point estimation neither for the risk parameter nor for the unobserved schooling factor. I decide to estimate the eect of risk on educational choice when both unobserved heterogeneity and risk are at their maximum possible values. Therefore, estimates shown in table 8 should be interpreted as the upper bound of the eect of risk on education decisions.
Estimation of equation (27) via multinomial probit would produce consistent estimates, but since I substitute estimates for the schooling coecient ν i and for wage and risk, the extra sampling variability needs to be accounted for. Therefore, standard errors shown in table 8 are obtained through bootstrapping. Table 8 lists the estimation for the coecients and marginal eects at mean for equation (27) by college major category. In order to make the coecient more readily interpretable, I take logarithms for all covariates. Therefore, the β's reported should be interpreted as the percentage change in the probability of selecting that particular group of majors, that a 1% change in the covariate causes.
The key parameters are the eect that dierences in personal risk have on educational choices.
From the estimated coecient it is immediately evident how educational decisions are signicantly and negatively inuenced by comparative dierences in risk levels. As the theory would suggest, decrease in the likelihood of selection for this particular category. The absence of any eect for the Humanities group might signal some dierent inclination towards risk for individuals of this category as consequence of their particular socio-economic status. In fact, if we look back at Table   1 we see how this group is formed by individuals with the best possible family background in terms of parents education and family income. This piece of evidence might support the intuition that good family background, serving as a buer in case of failure, encourages people to select riskier educations.
The eect of returns to education is also of the expected sign and also particularly strong for Health and Education group. As for the risk coecient, the faintest eect of wages on educational selection is detected for Humanities graduates. Table 9 provides a further scrutiny of the correlation patterns and thus individuals' personal advantages in terms of both expected wages and wages uncertainty in selecting one of the four major categories. The terms presented here refer to the correlation across the four possible major categories of expected wages and risk used in equation (27) for the estimation of the eect of returns and risk on choices. The three counterfactuals are imputed by matching and the risk coecients are correlated under the hypothesis of ρ = 1. From the Table we can detect a weak negative correlation for wages and a weak positive correlation for uncertainty for each possible pair. The highest correlation exists between Social Sciences and Sciences for wages and Social Sciences and Health and Education for wage uncertainty. Both the direction and the size of correlation signal the existence of comparative advantages. In fact, the direction suggests that individual do select their most advantageous options as a high income in the selected category is always associated with lower income in the alternative category and the opposite happens in the case of wage uncertainty.
On the other hand, the low correlation detected points towards a the existence of real outcome dierences as a consequence of major type selection.
In conclusion, the results presented here support a Roy model for selection of education driven 
